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I. INTRODUCTION
About a month before the 2014 election, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of four extraordinary orders in election
law cases. Without any explanation, the Court: stayed a district court
order which would have required Ohio to restore extra days of early
voting;1 stayed a Fourth Circuit order (partially reversing a district
court) which would have restored same-day voter registration and
the counting of certain provisional ballots in North Carolina;2 vacated
a Seventh Circuit stay of a district court order barring Wisconsin
from implementing its new strict voter identification law;3 and refused to vacate a Fifth Circuit stay of a district court order which
would have barred Texas from continuing to use its new strict voter

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law.
Thanks to Will Baude, Doug Chapin, Erwin Chemerinsky, Ned Foley, Michael Gilbert,
Linda Greenhouse, Doug Laycock, Richard Re, Michael Solimine, and Dan Tokaji for useful
comments and suggestions.
1. Husted v. Ohio State Conference of NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).
2. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.).
3. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.).
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identification law.4 The district court, after a trial on the merits, had
declared Texas’ law unconstitutional and in violation of the Voting
Rights Act.5
The orders appeared contradictory, for example by allowing strict
voter identification requirements to be used on Election Day 2014 in
Texas but not Wisconsin. But the apparent common thread, as suggested by Justice Alito’s dissent from the order in the Wisconsin case6
and by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent from the order in the Texas case,7
was the Supreme Court’s application of “the Purcell principle:” the
idea that courts should not issue orders which change election rules
in the period just before the election. This idea has appeared in earlier Supreme Court cases, most prominently in Purcell v. Gonzalez,8 a
2006 short per curiam case in which the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit injunction which had temporarily blocked use of Arizona’s strict
new voter identification law. The Court in Purcell criticized the
Ninth Circuit both for not explaining its reasoning and for issuing an
order just before an election which could cause voter confusion and
problems for those administering elections.9 In the 2014 election cases, the Court consistently voted against changing the electoral status
quo just before the election. Ironically, given the Court’s criticism of
the Ninth Circuit for not giving reasons in Purcell, the Court did not
explain its reasons in any of the 2014 election orders.
In this Article, I argue the Supreme Court should rein in the
Purcell principle. Certainly the potential for voter confusion and electoral chaos raise a strong public interest argument against last minute changes in election rules. But under normal Supreme Court remedial standards for considering stays and injunctions, the effect of a
court order on the public interest is only one factor to consider. Indeed, in Purcell itself the Court cautioned that “considerations specific to election cases” should be a factor “in addition to [weighing] the
harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction.”10
Although the precise test the Court uses in these emergency situations is somewhat fluid and uncertain, there is no doubt that ordinarily the Court considers the likelihood of success on the merits and
4. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.).
5. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 694 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
6. Frank, 135 S. Ct. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“There is a colorable basis for the
Court’s decision due to the proximity of the upcoming general election. It is particularly
troubling that absentee ballots have been sent out without any notation that proof of photo
identification must be submitted.”).
7. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (referencing and criticizing the application of the Purcell
principle to this case).
8. 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
9. Id. at 4-5.
10. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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relative hardship to the parties as two crucial factors in deciding
whether to grant or vacate a stay or impose an injunction. By making
the Purcell principle paramount, the Court runs the risk of issuing
orders, which can disenfranchise voters or impose significant burdens
on election administrators for no good reason. Had the Court applied
all the ordinary appropriate factors for emergency relief to the four
2014 election cases, in addition to special concerns attendant in election cases, there is a strong argument it would have reached a different decision in at least the Texas case and potentially in the North
Carolina case.
Part II of this Article explains the tests that the Court applies in
considering emergency stays and related orders, arguing that the
Purcell principle should properly be understood not as a stand-alone
rule but instead as relevant to one of the factors (the public interest)
the Court usually considers. Part III applies the proper standards to
the four 2014 emergency election cases considered by the Supreme
Court, arguing that the Court got it wrong in, at least, the Texas case
and possibly in the North Carolina case. Part IV briefly argues that,
regardless of whether the Supreme Court agrees with this call to rein
in the Purcell principle, the Court should issue opinions, even weeks
or months after the Court acts in an emergency elections case, explaining its reasoning. Such opinions would provide valuable guidance to lower courts considering election cases and help legitimize
the Court’s actions by making them more transparent. It also might
discipline the Justices to decide controversial cases more consistently.
II. SITUATING PURCELL IN THE USUAL PRACTICE FOR EMERGENCY
STAYS AND INJUNCTIONS AT THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Supreme Court’s Usual Practice for Granting Stays,
Vacating Stays, and Issuing Injunctions
Many Supreme Court practices and procedures are opaque and
mysterious; the opacity recently got attention when the Court failed
to explain its decision not to hear a large number of cases challenging
the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans and when it failed to
explain its emergency orders in controversial voting and abortion
cases.11

11. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court’s Actions Are Monumental, but the Why of its Reasoning Often Missing, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/supreme-courts-actions-are-monumental-but-the-why-of-its-reasoning-oftenmissing/2014/10/12/ca1ccc9c-4fca-11e4-8c24-487e92bc997b_story.html; Adam Liptak, Justices Drawing Dotted Lines with Terse Orders in Big Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/us/supreme-court-with-terse-orders-has-judges-andlawyers-reading-tea-leaves.html; Dahlia Lithwick, Injunction Junction: What is the Supreme Court Thinking Behind Its Unfathomable Silence?, SLATE (Oct. 16, 2014, 2:31 PM),
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The Court’s practices and procedures for reviewing emergency
stay and injunction requests are among the most mysterious, in part
because the Court often decides these cases without written explanation. The Court’s formal rules describe only the mechanics of seeking
stays and other emergency relief and not the substantive standards
of review or any requirement of an explanation. A request for emergency relief ordinarily starts with an application directed to the Supreme Court Justice assigned as Circuit Justice to hear emergency
matters from the Circuit. The Justice can decide the matter in chambers or refer it to the full Court for decision.12
Although the Justices have stated a variety of standards for deciding on emergency matters, they share factors typical for court review
of preliminary relief requests: likelihood of success on the merits, the
potential for irreparable injury to both parties, and the public interest. They all also give some measure of deference to the decision of
the lower court.13
1. Stays.
Perhaps the most common articulation of the standard for reviewing a request to stay a lower court ruling is Justice Brennan’s statement in the Rostker v. Goldberg case.14 Individual Justices frequently
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/supreme_court_
unsigned_orders_stays_and_injunctions_no_explanations_in_voter.html.
12. See SUP. CT. R. 21 (“Motions to the Court”); SUP. CT. R. 22 (“Applications to Individual Justices”); SUP. CT. R. 23 (“Stays”); STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 17, at 872-910 (10th ed. 2013).
13. See SHAPIRO, supra note 12, § 17.II.13, at 898 (listing the factors the Court considers for stays and temporary injunctions); id. at 907-08 (“How much weight is given the
ruling of the lower court will depend in large measure upon whether other factors to be
considered leave the Circuit Justice certain or uncertain as to whether a stay should be
granted. While not bound by the orders of the lower courts, the Circuit Justice will be
inclined to accept the prior ruling if the matter is deemed a close one, but not if the balance
of equities or the likelihood of reversal clearly call for a different result.”).
It does not appear that the Court has ever explained how the special standards for reviewing requests for emergency stays, vacating stays, and granting injunctions mesh with
the usual “abuse of discretion” standard of review that an appellate court applies to a nonemergency review of a trial court’s decision on a preliminary injunction.
14. 448 U.S. 1306 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers). As Justice Brennan put it:
The principles that control a Circuit Justice’s consideration of in-chambers
stay applications are well established. Relief from a single Justice is appropriate only in those extraordinary cases where the applicant is able to rebut the
presumption that the decisions below—both on the merits and on the proper
interim disposition of the case—are correct. In a case like the present one, this
can be accomplished only if a four-part showing is made. First, it must be
established that there is a “reasonable probability” that four Justices will
consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari or to note probable jurisdiction. Second, the applicant must persuade me that there is a fair
prospect that a majority of the Court will conclude that the decision below was
erroneous. While related to the first inquiry, this question may involve some-
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have cited the Rostker standard in in-chambers opinions as Justices
decided stay requests as a Circuit Justice.15 Only recently, however,
did the Supreme Court explicitly cite the Rostker test as the standard
the entire Court applies in considering whether or not to stay a lower
court order.
In the 2010 Hollingsworth v. Perry case,16 the Court considered a
motion to stay a trial court order to broadcast live proceedings from
the Proposition 8 same-sex marriage trial in San Francisco. In considering the stay request of same-sex marriage opponents, the Court
set forth the Rostker standard:
To obtain a stay pending the filing and disposition of a petition
for a writ of certiorari, an applicant must show (1) a reasonable
probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently
meritorious to grant certiorari; (2) a fair prospect that a majority of
the Court will vote to reverse the judgment below; and (3) a likelihood that irreparable harm will result from the denial of a stay. In
close cases the Circuit Justice or the Court will balance the equities and weigh the relative harms to the applicant and to the
respondent. Lucas v. Townsend (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers);
Rostker (Brennan, J., in chambers).17

Although the Hollingsworth decision staying the trial court’s
broadcast order split the Court 5-4, the dissenters articulated a substantially similar test for determining when the Court should grant a
stay of a lower court order. The dissent’s main concern instead was
what different considerations, especially in cases presented on direct appeal.
Third, there must be a demonstration that irreparable harm is likely to result
from the denial of a stay. And fourth, in a close case it may be appropriate to
“balance the equities”—to explore the relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the public at large.
Id. at 1308 (citations omitted).
15. According to a Westlaw search conducted in January 2015, Rostker has been cited
nineteen times in Court opinions, seventeen of which were in opinions from individual
Justices whom were sitting as a Circuit Justice. The case was cited once by Justice Brennan (also joined by Justice Marshall) in a dissenting opinion from Justice Rehnquist’s decision to grant a stay. Heckler v. Lopez, 464 U.S. 879, 885 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Hollingsworth, discussed below, is the most recent Supreme Court case citing Rostker.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010) (per curiam). Justice Thomas, in a very recent
statement joined by Justice Scalia, respected the denial of stay and also cited Hollingsworth’s recitation of the Rostker standard, writing: “I join my colleagues in denying
this application only because there appears to be no ‘reasonable probability that four Justices will consider the issue sufficiently meritorious to grant certiorari.’ That is unfortunate.” Maricopa County v. Lopez-Valenzuela, 135 S. Ct. 428, 428 (2014) (citing Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. at 190). Justice Thomas’s statement was noteworthy because it made
reference to, and criticized, the Court’s denial of certiorari in a number of same-sex marriage cases. See id. For more on stay standards, see SHAPIRO, supra note 12, § 17.II.3,
at 877-78.
16. 558 U.S. 183 (2010).
17. Id. at 190 (citing Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in
chambers); Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in chambers)).
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with application of the test to the facts of the case. Justice Breyer for
the dissenters stated the applicable test as follows:
The Court agrees that it can issue this extraordinary legal relief only if (1) there is a fair chance the District Court was wrong
about the underlying legal question, (2) that legal question meets
this Court’s certiorari standards, (3) refusal of the relief would
work “irreparable harm,” (4) the balance of the equities (including,
the Court should say, possible harm to the public interest) favors
issuance, (5) the party’s right to the relief is “clear and undisputable,” and (6) the “question is of public importance” (or otherwise
“peculiarly appropriate” for such action).18

2. Vacating Stays.
The Court’s standard for vacating a lower court stay appears similar to the standard for granting stays. However, the in-chambers
Western Airline opinion of Justice O’Connor19 and the in-chambers
Coleman opinion of then-Justice Rehnquist20 state that a Justice
should show great deference to a lower court (or at least a Court of
Appeals)21 which has granted a stay. Circuit Justices asked to vacate
a lower court stay have cited this standard in in-chambers opinions,
but these opinions have not yet been cited in a majority Supreme
Court opinion.22
However, the Court has come close. In a 2013 case, Planned
Parenthood v. Abbott,23 the Court denied a request to vacate a stay of
a trial court injunction limiting Texas’ ability to implement some new
Texas abortion restrictions that the Fifth Circuit had ordered. The
Fifth Circuit’s stay kept the restrictions in place pending further
litigation in the lower courts.
Justice Scalia (in a concurring statement for himself, Justice
Alito, and Justice Thomas) relied on Western Airlines and Coleman in
explaining the standard the Court should apply when asked to vacate
18. Id. at 199 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer cited the majority’s standard and
Rostker as the appropriate standard. Id. The Justices also discussed the standards for the
Court’s mandamus power, an issue that is beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 190.
19. W. Airlines, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 480 U.S. 1301, 1305
(1987) (O’Connor, J., in chambers).
20. Coleman v. PACCAR, Inc., 424 U.S. 1301, 1304 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., in
chambers).
21. I was unable to find any cases discussing whether the same standard of deference
should apply when a trial court stays its own order and an appellate court refuses to vacate
the stay.
22. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Campbell, 508 U.S. 1301 (1993) (O’Connor, J., in chambers)
(citing Coleman); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469 U.S. 1311 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers)
(citing Coleman); see also Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (Alito, J., joined by Scalia,
J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305).
23. 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013).
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the Fifth Circuit stay: “We may not vacate a stay entered by a court
of appeals unless that court clearly and ‘ “demonstrably” ’ erred in its
application of ‘ “accepted standards.” ’ ” 24
Justice Breyer in his dissent in Planned Parenthood also relied on
Western Airlines and Coleman in setting forth the standard:
This Court may vacate a stay entered by a court of appeals
where the case “ ‘could and very likely would be reviewed here upon final disposition in the court of appeals,’ ” “ ‘the rights of the
parties . . . may be seriously and irreparably injured by the stay,’ ”
and “ ‘the court of appeals is demonstrably wrong in its application
of accepted standards in deciding to issue the stay.’ ”25

The Justices in Planned Parenthood emphasized different aspects
of the Western Airlines/Coleman test. Justice Breyer mentioned consideration of the parties’ serious and irreparable injury, absent from
Justice Scalia’s formulation, which focused on demonstrable error.26
Whether or not there are appreciable differences in how the Justices view the Western Airlines/Coleman standard27 (and certainly
there are differences in application of the standard), both Justice
Scalia and Justice Beyer agreed28 that in determining whether the
Court of Appeals has made a “demonstrable error” in applying “accepted standards” for the granting of a stay, the Court will examine
whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the stay standards the
Court set out in its 2009 Nken v. Holder case:
(1) [W]hether the stay applicant has made a strong showing
that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant
will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance
of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies. There
is substantial overlap between these and the factors governing
preliminary injunctions; not because the two are one and the same,

24. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305 (O’Connor,
J., in chambers) (quoting Coleman, 424 U.S. at 1304 (Rehnquist, J., in chambers))).
25. Id. at 508-09 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305).
26. Id. at 506, 509.
27. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U.
J. L. & LIBERTY 1, 13 & n.38 (2015) (noting the lack of clarity over whether Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion disagreed with Justice Scalia’s opinion on whether a state necessarily
suffers irreparable injury when the state cannot enforce its laws).
28. Planned Parenthood, 134 S. Ct. at 506 (Scalia J., concurring) (“When deciding
whether to issue a stay, the Fifth Circuit had to consider [Nken’s] four factors . . . .”); id.
at 509 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Given these considerations, in my view, the standard
governing the Fifth Circuit’s decision whether to stay the District Court’s injunction was
not satisfied, and the standard governing this Court’s decision whether to vacate the Fifth
Circuit’s stay is satisfied.” (first citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009); then citing
W. Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 1305)).
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but because similar concerns arise whenever a court order may
allow or disallow anticipated action before the legality of that
action has been conclusively determined.
The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most
critical.29

3. Issuing Interlocutory Injunctions.
Finally, as noted in Nken,30 the Supreme Court applies a similar
standard to the stay standard in considering requests for an injunction before a final judgment. This point is worth considering because
the Court at least once has enjoined a local election after lower courts
have declined to do so.31 The Court has held that a request for such
an injunction “ ‘demands a significantly higher justification’ than a
request for a stay, because unlike a stay, an injunction ‘does not
simply suspend judicial alteration of the status quo but grants judicial intervention that has been withheld by lower courts.’ ”32
There are many in-chambers opinions from Justices (though apparently no majority opinion for the Court) stating that the right to
an injunction from the Supreme Court must be “indisputably clear”
before a Justice will grant it.33
As with the Court’s decisions on granting stays and vacating
stays, a court decision to grant an injunction requires looking at the
merits, the harm to the parties, and the public interest. As the Court
stated in its 2008 Winter case, “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”34

29. 556 U.S. at 434 (2009) (citations omitted).
30. See id. (“There is substantial overlap between these [stay standards] and the factors governing preliminary injunctions . . . .”).
31. Lucas v. Townsend, 486 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1988) (Kennedy, J., in chambers) (enjoining local election when date of election had not been precleared as required by section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act and lower court made “most problematic” conclusion under Supreme
Court precedent that changing the date of the local election need not be precleared under
section 5).
32. Respect Me. PAC v. McKee, 562 U.S. 996, 996 (2010) (quoting Ohio Citizens for
Responsible Energy, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 479 U.S. 1312, 1313 (1986)); see
also SHAPIRO, supra note 12, § 17.II.4, at 878-80 (noting that several Justices have
explained that an injunction requires a greater justification than a stay).
33. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 507 U.S. 1301, 1303 (1993) (Rehnquist,
C.J., in chambers); Ohio Citizens, 479 U.S. at 1313; Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb,
409 U.S. 1235, 1235 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).
34. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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4. The Common Standards and the Reality of Emergency Orders
in Contentious Cases.
Although the Supreme Court standards for (1) granting a stay, (2)
vacating a stay, and (3) issuing an injunction differ somewhat in
terms of the burden placed on the party seeking relief and the deference owed to the lower court, the standards all weigh the same issues
of likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury to the parties, and the public interest.
How important is each of these factors relative to each other, and
how does deference to lower courts play into the Court’s decision? It
is hard to say as a general matter, especially when many of these orders lack accompanying opinions. It appears, however, that the Justices’ views as to the merits of the parties’ claims loom heavily in
many of the cases, as does a desire to avoid changing the status quo
or making major legal pronouncements in some controversial cases in
which the issue is before the Court on an expedited and emergency
basis and perhaps likely to return soon on a fuller record.
Consider, for example, the Court’s order issued a few days after
the final opinion day of the October 2013 term involving religious exemptions to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate. In
Wheaton College v. Burwell,35 the Supreme Court issued an injunction allowing a religious college not to use a form prescribed by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to let the Department know of the College’s religious objections to contraception coverage through its insurance plan so long as the College “informs the
Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that it is a nonprofit organization that holds itself out as religious and has religious
objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services.”36 The
Court noted that lower courts had divided on the question whether
such an accommodation was required, and the Court cautioned that
“this order should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s
views on the merits.”37 It was an odd statement given that the test for
granting an injunction requires considering the likelihood of success
on the merits and given some authority for the standard that petitioners’ right to relief be “indisputably clear.”38
Justice Sotomayor, dissenting for herself and Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan, argued that the Court did not follow its usual skeptical
standards for issuing an injunction:

35.
36.
37.
38.

134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
Id. at 2807.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 33.
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Even if one accepts Wheaton’s view that the self-certification
procedure violates RFRA, that would not justify the Court’s action
today. The Court grants Wheaton a form of relief as rare as it is
extreme: an interlocutory injunction under the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651, blocking the operation of a duly enacted law and
regulations, in a case in which the courts below have not yet adjudicated the merits of the applicant’s claims and in which those
courts have declined requests for similar injunctive relief. Injunctions of this nature are proper only where “the legal rights at issue
are indisputably clear.” Yet the Court today orders this extraordinary relief even though no one could credibly claim Wheaton’s
right to relief is indisputably clear.39

The short but controversial order and dissent left Professor Richard Re scratching his head as to why the Court majority in Wheaton
College did not even discuss the applicable standard of review40 and
whether the “indisputably clear” standard might apply only to inchambers, and not full Court, injunctions.41
The Justices’ concerns about the merits may have explained the
result: all the conservative Justices apparently agreed with (or at
least did not publicly dissent from) the Court’s order granting the
injunction; all of the liberal Justices (aside from Justice Breyer) expressly stated their disagreement with the order in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent.42 This tracked the division in the Court’s recent
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.43 case raising similar issues and
offering a similar split. Or perhaps, as Professor Will Baude suggests,

39. 134 S. Ct. at 2808 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
40. See Richard M. Re, What Standard of Review Did the Court Apply in Wheaton
College?, RE’S JUDICATA (July 5, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://richardresjudicata.wordpress.com/
2014/07/05/what-standard-of-review-did-the-court-apply-in-wheaton-college/.
41. See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist succinctly stated the stringent standard he used in
deciding whether to issue an injunction pending appeal in another election case:
An injunction pending appeal barring the enforcement of an Act of Congress would be an extraordinary remedy, particularly when this Court recently
held BCRA facially constitutional and when a unanimous three-judge District
Court rejected applicant’s request for a preliminary injunction. The All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), is the only source of this Court’s authority to issue
such an injunction. That authority is to be used “sparingly and only in the most
critical and exigent circumstances.” It is only appropriately exercised where (1)
“Necessary or appropriate in aid of [our] jurisdictio[n],” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a),
and (2) the legal rights at issue are “indisputably clear.”
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 542 U.S. 1305, 1305-06 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., in chambers) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
42. 134 S. Ct. at 2807-15.
43. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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the Court decided that preserving the status quo was more important
than applying the usual test.44 We do not know because the Court did
not tell us.
B. Fitting Purcell into the Supreme Court’s Usual Practice
As in Wheaton College, the Supreme Court in Purcell v. Gonzalez45
declined to opine on the merits of the case involving Arizona’s voter
identification law. The Court noted that disputes over voter identification laws are “hotly contested,” declaring: “We underscore that we
express no opinion here on the correct disposition, after full briefing
and argument.”46 This was not the only unusual thing about how the
Supreme Court handled the Purcell case.
Purcell arose out of a ballot initiative, Proposition 200, which
Arizona voters approved in 2004. The measure required proof of
citizenship upon registering to vote and presentation of certain forms
of identification to cast an in-person ballot on Election Day.47 After
the United States Department of Justice precleared the Arizona law
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, a group of individuals and
organizations opposed to the law filed a federal lawsuit in May 2006.
On September 11, 2006, the trial court denied the challengers’
request for a preliminary injunction, without issuing findings of facts
or conclusions of law. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of a preliminary
injunction to the Ninth Circuit, which set a briefing schedule that
would have concluded two weeks after the November 7, 2006 election.
Plaintiffs then requested an injunction pending appeal from the
Ninth Circuit preventing the State from enforcing the voter identification requirement at the November 7 election. On October 5,
[A]fter receiving lengthy written responses from the State and the
county officials but without oral argument, the panel issued a four44. Baude, supra note 27, at 11-12.
On one hand, they seem to have been motivated by a common-sense desire to
preserve the status quo. But the Court has rules for these things, and it is not
easy to tell how they permitted these orders. For instance, in her Wheaton
College dissent, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that members of the majority
had previously written that an injunction could issue only if the plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief was “indisputably clear.” The majority seemed to reject this
standard by protesting that its “order should not be construed as an expression
of the Court’s views on the merits,” but did not explain more. The Court issued
a four-paragraph unsigned opinion that left the legal standard and its legal
basis a mystery.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
45. 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam). The facts described in the next few paragraphs
appear in similar form in Purcell. Id. at 2-4.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Under the law, a voter who voted early did not need to present identification. Id.
at 2.
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sentence order enjoining Arizona from enforcing Proposition 200’s
provisions pending disposition, after full briefing, of the appeals of
the denial of a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals offered no explanation or justification for its order. Four days later,
the court denied a motion for reconsideration. [Yet again the
Court] gave no rationale for [its] decision.48
Despite the time-sensitive nature of the proceedings and the
pendency of a request for emergency relief in the Court of Appeals,
the District Court did not issue its findings of fact and conclusions
of law until October 12. It then concluded that “plaintiffs have
shown a possibility of success on the merits of some of their arguments but the Court cannot say that at this stage they have shown
a strong likelihood.” The District Court then found the balance of
the harms and the public interest counseled in favor of denying the
injunction.49

Arizona and county officials moved to stay the Ninth Circuit’s
grant of an injunction.50 The Supreme Court construed the filings as
a petition for certiorari, granted the petition, and vacated the order of
the Court of Appeals,51 a rare enough event that Professor Orin Kerr
referred to it as equivalent to a judicial bolt of lightning.52
In analyzing whether the Ninth Circuit erred in granting a stay,
the Supreme Court began with a paragraph that seemed deliberately
drafted to present both sides of the contentious debate over voter
identification laws.53 (Elsewhere, I have criticized one statement in
this paragraph, as unsupported by citation or empirical evidence,

48. Id. at 3.
49. Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id.
52. Orin Kerr, Supreme Court Allows Voter ID Law, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 20,
2006, 5:05 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1161378321.shtml.
53.
A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of
its election process. Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is
essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives
honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of our
government. Voters who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised. [T]he right of suffrage can be denied
by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively
as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. Countering the
State’s compelling interest in preventing voter fraud is the plaintiffs’ strong
interest in exercising the fundamental political right to vote. Although the likely effects of Proposition 200 are much debated, the possibility that qualified
voters might be turned away from the polls would caution any district judge to
give careful consideration to the plaintiffs’ challenges.
Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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suggesting that voter identification laws promote voter confidence
and that voters “who fear their legitimate votes will be outweighed by
fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”)54
The Court then stated the basis for staying the Ninth Circuit’s order and vacating the injunction:
Faced with an application to enjoin operation of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election, the Court of Appeals was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant
upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures. Court
orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain
away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase. So the Court of Appeals may have deemed this consideration to be grounds for prompt action. Furthermore, it might have
given some weight to the possibility that the nonprevailing parties
would want to seek en banc review. In the Ninth Circuit that procedure, involving voting by all active judges and an en banc hearing by a court of 15, can consume further valuable time. These
considerations, however, cannot be controlling here. It was still
necessary, as a procedural matter, for the Court of Appeals to give
deference to the discretion of the District Court. We find no indication that it did so, and we conclude this was error.
Although at the time the Court of Appeals issued its order the
District Court had not yet made factual findings to which the
Court of Appeals owed deference, by failing to provide any factual
findings or indeed any reasoning of its own the Court of Appeals
left this Court in the position of evaluating the Court of Appeals’
bare order in light of the District Court’s ultimate findings. There
has been no explanation given by the Court of Appeals showing the
ruling and findings of the District Court to be incorrect. In view of
the impending election, the necessity for clear guidance to the
State of Arizona, and our conclusion regarding the Court of
Appeals’ issuance of the order we vacate the order of the Court of
Appeals.
We underscore that we express no opinion here on the correct
disposition, after full briefing and argument, of the appeals from
the District Court’s September 11 order or on the ultimate resolution of these cases. As we have noted, the facts in these cases are
hotly contested, and “[n]o bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements.” Giv54. Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32, 3536 (2007); see Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Essay, Vote Fraud in the Eye of
the Beholder: The Role of Public Opinion in the Challenge to Voter Identification Requirements, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2008) (finding that voter confidence in the electoral process
is not correlated with the presence or absence of voter identification laws in the state).

440

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:427

en the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow
the election to proceed without an injunction suspending the voter
identification rules.55

This was the entirety of the Supreme Court’s substantive analysis.
Justice Stevens issued a three-sentence concurrence noting the factual disputes over the extent of disenfranchisement and fraud and
stating that the Court’s order “will provide the courts with a better
record on which to judge their constitutionality.”56
The Purcell decision is both overdetermined and undertheorized.
We do not know how much the case turned upon the failure of the
Ninth Circuit to give reasons for its order (despite the trial court’s
failure to make timely factual findings and issue conclusions of law
for the Ninth Circuit to review) and how much turned on the Ninth
Circuit’s failure to take into account “considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures.”57 On considerations
specific to election cases, the Court mentioned both the potential for
voter confusion which could depress turnout and the State of Arizona’s need for “clear guidance” to run its election.58
We also do not know how much the close timing of the election,
combined with the possibility of en banc review, mattered. The Court
wrote only that the Ninth Circuit “might” have taken the possibility
of further review into account in drafting its order.59 Arizona in its
filing asked the Court to apply the Coleman “demonstrably wrong”
test in the case,60 but the Court in Purcell did not cite Coleman or
apply it.
Even though the Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for its failure
to give reasons or to defer to the district court (even in the absence of
the district court’s factual findings), the Court itself refused to weigh
in on the merits of the parties’ arguments.61 This agnosticism, like in
Wheaton College, appears to violate the Court’s own standards for a
stay. Under Rostker, the Court should have considered the likelihood
that the challengers could have successfully challenged the law as
well as the potential irreparable injury to all the parties and to the
public interest.

55. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-6 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 6 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 5.
59. Id.
60. Application for Stay of Injunction Pending Appeal at 10, Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485
F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-16702, 06-16706).
61. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
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The Court was right to note special considerations in election cases, what I call “the Purcell principle.” When the rules for elections
change, voters may not only be confused; they can be disenfranchised
(for example, by not having the right documentation or showing up at
the wrong polling place). Further, electoral chaos can ensue when
election officials face conflicting court orders on how to run an election. Adding, removing, or changing election procedures just before
the election can be difficult. Professional election administrators, especially in large jurisdictions, rely on cadres of poll worker volunteers
who must be trained. It is tough to retrain these workers on new
rules or procedures close to the election and to produce appropriate
new written instructions the period just before the election—
especially in jurisdictions using multiple languages.
These special concerns in election cases should have counted toward the public interest factor in the Court’s Rostker test. But these
considerations should not have been considered while disregarding
the other traditional factors for granting or denying preliminary relief: the likelihood of success on the merits and the relative hardship
to the parties. The Court acknowledged that point by noting that it
was raising special election-related considerations “in addition to the
harms attendant upon the issuance or nonissuance of an injunction.”62
Two examples demonstrate why courts should consider all relevant factors (likelihood of success on the merits, relative irreparable
harm to the parties, and the public interest) in deciding whether to
grant a stay or other preliminary relief:
Example 1: A local city council passes an ordinance requiring
voters to pay a poll tax in city elections one month before the election. A group of voters goes to court to have the poll tax declared
unconstitutional. A week before the election, a court issues an injunction preventing the city from enforcing the poll tax. Before the
court order, all poll workers had been sent instructions on how to
implement the poll tax. The city seeks a stay from an appellate
court.
Example 2: Plaintiffs bring a complex challenge arguing that
parts of a state legislative redistricting plan violate section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. Two months before the election, when campaigns are underway and ballots have been printed, a federal court
in a split decision determines that some of the districts violate the
Act and must be redrawn. The court issues an order requiring that
elections be run under new district lines, with a new candidate residency period and new ballots. Whether the court properly interpreted section 2 is uncertain. The State seeks a stay from the Supreme Court to run elections under the old lines.

62. Id. at 4.
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In both examples, the Purcell principle, applied to its fullest,
would tell the courts to stay the lower court’s order because we are in
the period just before the election, when voters can be confused and
election administrators burdened by election changes. However,
these public interest concerns, while relevant, should not be the sole
consideration.
In Example 1, the poll tax has been unconstitutional on the state
and local level since the 1966 Supreme Court opinion in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections.63 Therefore, the challengers’ chances of success on the merits are 100 percent, and that should be a major factor in favor of the lower court injunction and against a stay.
Further, a poll tax imposes a huge burden on poor voters who could
be disenfranchised by the tax, making the irreparable injury on the
challengers’ side greater. Despite timing close to the election, and
any hassle for election administrators to change instructions for running the election, the lower court should enjoin the poll tax and an
appellate court should not stay such an order. Even a Supreme Court
inclined to usually follow the Purcell principle would likely give way
in a case like this one.
In Example 2, the likelihood of success on the merits is uncertain.
Further, there are great reliance interests in running elections under
the already-declared lines. Voters, candidates, and others campaigned under the old district lines. It is not just a question of election administrators being inconvenienced but also of disrupting settled expectations throughout the jurisdiction. Minority voters may
have less effective votes in these districts, but they are not literally
disenfranchised. With an election looming, courts should make their
changes effective for the next election cycle. This is precisely what
the courts did in the 1960s redistricting cases when the Court
declared elections from substantially unequal districts to be unconstitutional.64 Timing matters much more here, as do reliance inter63. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
64. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (“We feel that the District Court in
this case acted in a most proper and commendable manner. It initially acted wisely in declining to stay the impending primary election in Alabama, and properly refrained from
acting further until the Alabama Legislature had been given an opportunity to remedy the
admitted discrepancies in the State’s legislative apportionment scheme, while initially
stating some of its views to provide guidelines for legislative action. And it correctly recognized that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative consideration
and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature
fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after
having had an adequate opportunity to do so. Additionally, the court below acted with
proper judicial restraint, after the Alabama Legislature had failed to act effectively in remedying the constitutional deficiencies in the State’s legislative apportionment scheme, in
ordering its own temporary reapportionment plan into effect, at a time sufficiently early to
permit the holding of elections pursuant to that plan without great difficulty, and in prescribing a plan admittedly provisional in purpose so as not to usurp the primary responsibility for reapportionment which rests with the legislature.”); see also Riley v. Kennedy,
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ests, as measured against uncertain success on the merits. The court
likely should not make any changes close to the election.
It would be a much harder case, however, if the courts had determined that the State’s section 2 liability was clearly established.
In that case the merits would point strongly in one direction and the
other factors strongly in the other. In such a case, the timing and disruption issues seem important, as does the judgment of the lower
court as to what is feasible in terms of election administration changes in the period just before the election.
All of this complex balancing was missing in Purcell. The Court
not only ignored the likelihood of success on the merits; it affirmatively refused to take a position on it.65 It did not look at harms to the
parties aside from the public interest in not changing the rules close
to an election.66
It is certainly understandable that the Court in Purcell avoided
saying anything on the merits, given how controversial voter identification laws were and are. The next time the Court considered a voter
identification law, in the 2008 Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board case,67 the Court divided 3-3-3 in setting forth the constitutional standard and applying that standard to review Indiana’s voter
identification law. As we will see in the next Part, if and when the
Court considers these issues on the merits, it is likely to divide along
ideological lines once again.
But in eschewing discussion of the merits and of the relative irreparable harms to the challengers and to the State of Arizona (aside
from its incorporation in the special election considerations), the
Court in Purcell deviated from its normal (stated) practice for emergency relief, raising risks to both voters and those who run elections.
There is one benefit to strict application of the Purcell principle: it
cabins some discretion of lower court judges through a per se rule to
not allow last-minute judicial changes to election rules. That could be
a benefit in highly charged political cases, but the price is too high, as
it requires courts to ignore other important factors in deciding
whether to grant extraordinary relief. Further, if we do not trust the
courts to fairly decide cases on emergency measures for elections,
why should we trust courts to fairly decide cases on other controversial issues, like abortion or religious exemptions to health care?
In sum, the Court correctly drew attention to special questions of
timing before elections. But the Purcell principle needs to be domes553 U.S. 406, 409 (2008) (“[P]ractical considerations sometimes require courts to allow
elections to proceed despite pending legal challenges.”).
65. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5.
66. See id.
67. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
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ticated. Courts (including the Supreme Court) should consider the
likelihood of success on the merits, potential irreparable harm to both
sides, and other public interest factors in deciding whether or not to
issue orders affecting elections in the period close to the election.
When both the likelihood of success and irreparable harm point in
the same direction, this is a strong argument for the Court to rule in that
direction regardless of the direction pointed by the Purcell principle.
The parties’ diligence is also relevant. In Purcell, the challengers
waited months (and two elections) before seeking a preliminary injunction. Consideration of laches would be appropriate.68 Further,
courts should consider whether it might be possible to run elections
using the rules already set by election officials but with the use
of provisional ballots to resolve disputes after the election.69 On the
other hand, doing so would put even greater pressure on courts deciding issues post-election, when the decision is more likely to be outcome determinative.70
In sum, the Supreme Court should adjudicate its election disputes
consistent with the general standards and levels of deference it has
established for considering non-election requests to stay a lower court
order, vacate a lower court stay, or issue an injunction in its own
right. Special considerations related to elections should be one, but
not a dominating, factor. Adherence to the usual rules makes it less
likely the Court will be fully swayed by perceived differences in the
merits in these highly political and ideologically-charged cases.
III. PROPERLY APPLYING USUAL SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
TO THE 2014 EMERGENCY ELECTION CASES
A. The Reason for the Flurry of Election 2014 Emergency Cases
The spate of emergency election cases reaching the Supreme
Court in the fall of 2014 was unsurprising for those in the election
law field. Since the disputed 2000 election, culminating in the
Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Bush v. Gore71 ending the
Florida recount and ensuring George W. Bush’s ascendance to the

68. For an argument on an increased use of laches in election cases, see Richard L.
Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid
Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 998-99 (2005).
69. For more on the potential for increased use of provisional ballots, see Edward B.
Foley & Joshua A. Douglas, Opinion, Election 2014: The Vote You Save May Be Your Own,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/opinion/elections-2014-thevote-you-save-may-be-your-own.html?_r=0.
70. See Hasen, supra note 68, at 991-99 (arguing for courts, if possible, to resolve election disputes before, rather than after, an election to avoid just such a problem).
71. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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presidency,72 the amount of election legislation and litigation has increased markedly. Litigation has more than doubled in the post-2000
period compared to the pre-2000 period.73 Among other things, this
period of the Voting Wars has seen Republican state legislatures pass
laws which have made it more difficult to register and vote and
Democratic state legislatures pass laws which have made it easier to
vote.74 Cries (often unsubstantiated) of great problems with voter
fraud and voter suppression fill not only the airwaves and internet
but also courthouses across the country as laws have been
challenged.
The latest wave of litigation follows the Supreme Court’s 2008
decision in the Crawford case rejecting a facial challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause to Indiana’s voter identification law75 and
the Supreme Court’s decision in the 2013 Shelby County v. Holder
case76 effectively removing a provision of the Voting Rights Act requiring jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination in voting
from getting preclearance from the federal government before making any changes in their voting rules.77
In the wake of these decisions, both jurisdictions which were subject to preclearance (Texas) and those not subject to preclearance but
under Republican control (Wisconsin) passed stricter voter identification and other restrictive election laws.78 When preclearance ended,
Texas put its stalled voter identification law into immediate effect, a
law which had been blocked first by the Department of Justice and
then denied preclearance by a federal court in Washington, D.C.79
North Carolina, which used to be partially covered by preclearance,
passed the strictest set of voting rules since the passage of the 1965
Voting Rights Act.80 Among other things, the law ended same-day

72. For a chronology of the events, see RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 11-40
(2012).
73. RICHARD L. HASEN, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: LEGISLATION, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW 304 (2014).
74. See generally Hasen, supra note 68 (describing efforts to change election rules on a
partisan basis in states across the United States).
75. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
76. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
77. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713 (2014) (describing and analyzing the Shelby County
decision).
78. See Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars Heat Up: Will the Supreme Court Allow
States to Restrict Voting for Partisan Advantage?, SLATE (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:30 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/voting_restrictions_
may_reach_the_supreme_court_from_ohio_wisconsin_north.html.
79. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117, 127 (D.D.C. 2012).
80. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About
Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV.

446

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:427

voter registration, cut back on early voting, stopped the counting of
provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct (even if the result of
pollworker error), imposed a new voter identification requirement
(but not to be put into effect until the 2016 elections), and made other
changes making it harder to register and to vote.81 In Ohio, the state
legislature cut back on the amount of early voting, after an earlier
attempt to do so was blocked by a federal court.82
Federal challenges to the new voting restrictions raised two main
claims83: that these laws violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
and that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.84 Both claims posed significant challenges for plaintiffs. Ever since the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles,85 section 2 had been widely used in the redistricting context
to challenge a jurisdiction’s failure to create enough majorityminority districts.86 However, section 2 had not been used much (or
at least with much success) to challenge election administration rules
such as voter identification, in what Professor Dan Tokaji has aptly
named the “new vote denial” cases.87 Further, since Crawford, constitutional equal protection challenges to voter identification laws
seemed difficult for plaintiffs to win under the sliding scale approach
endorsed by the three Justices in the middle of the Supreme Court.88

L. REV. F. 58 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/race-or-party-how-courts-shouldthink-about-republican-efforts-to-make-it-harder-to-vote-in-north-carolina-and-elsewhere/.
81. Id.
82. See Ohio State Conference of NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio
2014); Obama for Am. v. Husted, 888 F. Supp. 2d 897 (S.D. Ohio 2012), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423
(6th Cir. 2012).
83. Some of the challengers to these laws raised state law claims. For example, challengers to Pennsylvania’s laws succeeded in having the law temporarily blocked on state
law grounds upon demonstrating that Pennsylvania’s Department of Transportation was
not up to the task of getting identification cards into the hands of voters who wanted them
in time for the 2012 elections. After a state trial court held that the law violated the state
constitution, the State chose not to appeal. Martha T. Moore, Pennsylvania Drops
Court Effort to Save Voter ID Law, USA TODAY (May 8, 2014, 5:34 PM),
http://onpolitics.usatoday.com/2014/05/08/pennsylvania-drops-effort-to-save-voter-id-law/. I
ignore these state claims here, as they generally do not end up before the U.S. Supreme
Court. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that Florida Supreme Court’s decision
to order statewide recount of undervotes pursuant to state law created a federal equal protection violation).
84. In Texas’ case, challengers also argued that the law was an unconstitutional poll
tax, a theory the trial court accepted. See infra note 100.
85. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
86. See HASEN, supra note 73, at 280-88.
87. Id. at 288-92; see Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform
Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006).
88. On the uncertainty of the balancing test, see Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward
B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological
Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 507 (2008); Justin Levitt,
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As Republican-dominated states enacted identification laws stricter
than Indiana’s, however, some plaintiffs had new hopes equal protection challenges could succeed.89
B. The Ohio, North Carolina, Wisconsin,
and Texas Emergency Cases
The four cases that made it to the Supreme Court—Ohio, North
Carolina, Wisconsin, and Texas—each raised both section 2 Voting
Rights Act claims and equal protection claims. Below, I briefly describe the claims and their likelihood of success, leaving a fuller discussion of the merits of the claims to another time.
1. Ohio.
Ohio’s case appeared to be the weakest on the merits, yet it
succeeded in both the federal district court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit before being reversed by the
Supreme Court.90 Plaintiffs challenged Ohio’s cutback on early voting
from thirty-five days to twenty-eight days, including the elimination
of “Golden Week,” a week’s period in which voters could both register
to vote and cast an early vote in the same transaction. The Republican legislature passed the measure after an earlier attempt to cut
back on early voting failed in 2012. In that first cutback, the legislature (apparently inadvertently) cut back on the last weekend of early
voting for all voters except certain military and overseas voters. A
federal district court held that this disparate treatment violated
equal protection.
In the new challenge, plaintiffs appeared before the same district
court judge as in the 2012 case, and the judge held the new cutback
violated both the Equal Protection Clause and section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Minority voters were especially likely to use both early
voting and Golden Week, and the judge found the cutbacks illegal.
The district court, relying in part on Ohio’s decision to cut back early
voting (as opposed to analyzing the total amount of early voting Ohio
offered under the new law), found both constitutional and voting
rights violations. The trial judge ordered Ohio to restore the cut early
voting period.

Crawford—More Rhetorical Bark Than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 2,
2008), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/crawford-more-rhetorical-bark-legal-bite.
89. On post-Crawford developments, see HASEN, supra note 73, at 308-10.
90. For the facts and procedural history described below, see Ohio State Conference of
NAACP v. Husted, 43 F. Supp. 3d 808 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (granting preliminary injunction),
stay denied pending appeal, 769 F.3d 385 (6th Cir. 2014), aff’d on merits, 768 F.3d 524 (6th
Cir. 2014), stay granted, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).
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Even with the cutbacks, Ohio offered more than the average
amount of early voting, and many states (such as New York) offered
no early voting at all. Further, Ohio offered no excuse absentee balloting across the state and sent every single voter an absentee ballot
application. The judge found African-American voters mistrustful of
absentee voting and held it not a sufficient substitute for the loss on
in-person early voting.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit first refused to stay the trial court’s order and later issued an opinion affirming the district court. Ohio then sought a stay with the Supreme
Court. The Court granted the stay, with the four more liberal Justices noting their dissent from the order. There was no written opinion
or explanation offered by any Justice.91
2. North Carolina.
In North Carolina, plaintiffs filed voting rights and constitutional
challenges to a number of provisions of the 2013 omnibus law making
it harder to register and vote.92 The federal government sued as well,
seeking to also get North Carolina “bailed in” to preclearance under
section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, a claim which remains pending.93
The federal district court set a trial date of July 2015, and plaintiffs
moved for a preliminary injunction to block some of the election
91. The Court’s order reads in full:
Application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to
the Court granted, and the district court’s September 4, 2014, order granting
a preliminary injunction stayed pending the timely filing and disposition of a
petition for writ certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied,
this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for writ of
certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the
judgment of this Court. Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, Justice Sotomayor,
and Justice Kagan would deny the application for stay.
Ohio State Conference, 135 S. Ct. at 42. Months after the election, the case settled. Rick
Hasen, Ohio Early Voting Suit Settled, with Elimination of Significant “Golden Week”,
ELECTION L. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2015, 9:12 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=71807.
92. For the facts and procedural history described below, see N.C. State Conference v.
McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 322 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (denying preliminary injunction), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d
224 (4th Cir. 2014) (ordering the trial court to grant a preliminary injunction in order to
end same-day voter registration and counting of certain out-of-precinct ballots), stayed sub
nom. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.) (staying
Fourth Circuit order and mandate).
93. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department to File Lawsuit Against the
State of North Carolina to Stop Discriminatory Changes to Voting Law (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-file-lawsuit-against-state-north-carolinastop-discriminatory-changes (“The complaint asks the court to prohibit North Carolina
from enforcing these requirements, and also requests that the court order bail-in relief
under section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act. If granted, this would subject North Carolina to
a new preclearance requirement.”).
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changes for the 2014 election season. The voter identification law was
not yet in effect for 2014, but there was a “soft rollout” set for 2014
(in which poll workers would ask for identification but not turn people away who lacked it). One of the sets of plaintiffs sought to block
that soft roll out.
The federal district court denied the preliminary injunction sought
to enjoin a number of the new voting rules, primarily on grounds that
based upon the evidence presented thus far, coupled with the judge’s
views of how to decide section 2 vote denial claims, the plaintiffs were
not likely to succeed on the merits and did not face irreparable injury.
Plaintiffs then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit. In a 2-1 vote, the court granted a preliminary injunction in part. The injunction was granted only as to two provisions
of the law, which were the subject of the preliminary injunction motion: the rollback in early voting and the end of counting ballots cast
in the wrong precinct. The Fourth Circuit held plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on their section 2 claims as to these two provisions. The
dissent, after running through the Winter factors for a preliminary
injunction, cited Purcell as an additional reason to deny the request.94
94. Judge Motz wrote in her dissent:
While securing reversal of a denial of preliminary relief is an uphill battle
for any movant, Appellants face a particularly steep challenge here. For “considerations specific to election cases,” including the risk of voter confusion,
counsel extreme caution when considering preliminary injunctive relief that
will alter electoral procedures. Because those risks increase “[a]s an election
draws closer,” so too must a court’s caution. Moreover, election cases like the
one at hand, in which an appellate court is asked to reverse a district court’s
denial of a preliminary injunction, risk creating “conflicting orders” which “can
themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away
from the polls.”
League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 250-51 (Motz, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). Judge Motz added in a footnote:
Although the majority steadfastly asserts that the requested injunction
seeks only to maintain the status quo, the provisions challenged by Appellants
were enacted more than a year ago and governed the statewide primary elections held on May 6, 2014. Appellants did not move for a preliminary injunction
until May 19, 2014, almost two weeks after the new electoral procedures had
been implemented in the primary. Moreover, regardless of how one conceives of
the status quo, there is simply no way to characterize the relief requested by
Appellants as anything but extraordinary. Appellants ask a federal court to order state election officials to abandon their electoral laws without first resolving the question of the legality of those laws.
Id. at 250 n.*. The majority also distinguished Purcell noting that:
In Purcell, on which the dissenting opinion relies, the Supreme Court
seemed troubled by the fact that a two-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit
entered a factless, groundless “bare order” enjoining a new voter identification
provision in an impending election. At the time of the “bare order,” the appellate court also lacked findings by the district court. By contrast, neither district
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North Carolina then asked the Supreme Court to stay the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling. The Supreme Court stayed the Fourth Circuit’s
grant of a preliminary injunction, with Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor noting their dissent. The majority again offered no reasoning to accompany its order. Justice Ginsburg wrote a fourparagraph dissent, stating in part that:
The Court of Appeals determined that at least two of the
measures—elimination of same-day registration and termination
of out-of-precinct voting—risked significantly reducing opportunities for black voters to exercise the franchise in violation
of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. I would not displace that recordbased reasoned judgment.95

Justice Ginsburg did not explain why she would defer to the Court
of Appeals’ “record-based” judgment over the “record-based” judgment of the trial court.
3. Wisconsin.
In Wisconsin, a federal district court issued a lengthy opinion
holding that Wisconsin’s strict voter identification law violated both
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause.96
The judge offered a very broad reading of section 2’s application to
vote denial cases and held that Wisconsin could not implement its
law or any revised voter identification law without court approval.
The trial judge concluded that over 300,000 Wisconsin voters lacked
the proper identification and had no easy way of securing it.
The State of Wisconsin appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and sought a stay of the district
court’s order so that it could use the identification requirement in its
upcoming election. The Seventh Circuit put off the stay request until
after oral argument in the case, which took place about eight weeks
before the election. Later, the same day as the oral argument, the

court nor appellate court reasoning, nor lengthy opinions explaining that reasoning, would be lacking in this case.
Id. at 248 n.6 (citation omitted).
95. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. at 6 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
96. For the facts and procedural history described below, see Frank v. Walker, 17 F.
Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (holding that Wisconsin’s voter identification law violated
Voting Rights Act Section 2 and the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and
enjoining the law’s use in elections), stay granted, 766 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2014), reh’g en
banc denied by equally divided court, 769 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), rev’d, 768
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014), vacating stay, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.), reh’g en banc denied by
equally divided court, 773 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (mem.).
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Seventh Circuit panel in a brief order stayed the trial court’s order
and allowed the State to move forward with implementing its voter
identification law pending the outcome of the appeal.
Plaintiffs sought en banc review in the Seventh Circuit, arguing
that there was no time to implement the law and get identification
cards in the hands of all voters that wanted cards before the election.
The State’s original plan called for an eight-month rollout of the
identification law in the event it was upheld by the courts. The State
of Wisconsin conceded in its filings that up to ten percent of the
state’s voters would be unable to get identification in time for the
upcoming election, and the problem would be especially acute for
Wisconsin residents born in another state, who could have delays in
securing a birth certificate from another state. Further, some voters
had already received and voted with absentee ballots, but those ballots would not count unless voters supplied new identification
information.
The full Seventh Circuit denied the request for an en banc hearing, evenly dividing 5-5 on the request. Judge Williams, for the five
dissenters, called the order to allow the identification requirement
to go into immediate effect with the admitted reality of disenfranchisement “shocking.”97 The challengers then sought a Supreme
Court vacation of the Seventh Circuit stay. While the case was being
briefed at the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, issued an opinion on the merits, strongly
rejecting the section 2 and constitutional claims. The full Seventh
Circuit, upon the request of a judge on the court, then sua sponte
considered rehearing the panel’s final ruling en banc. That request
failed again on a 5-5 even vote, with Judge Posner writing a scathing
97. Frank, 769 F.3d at 498 (Williams, J., dissenting). Judge Williams, dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc, wrote:
The district court found that 300,000 registered voters—registered voters,
not just persons eligible to vote—lack the most common form of identification
needed to vote in the upcoming elections in Wisconsin. (To put this number in
context, the 2010 governor’s race in Wisconsin was decided by 124,638 votes
and the election for United States Senator by 105,041 votes.) And how does the
state reply to the fact that numerous registered voters do not have qualifying
identification with elections so imminent? It brazenly responds that the district
court found that “more than 90% of Wisconsin’s registered voters already have
a qualifying ID” and can vote and that “the voter ID law will have little impact
on the vast majority of voters.” But the right to vote is not the province of just
the majority. It is not just held by those who have cars and so already have
driver’s licenses and by those who travel and so already have passports. The
right to vote is also held, and held equally, by all citizens of voting age. It simply cannot be the answer to say that 90% of registered voters can still vote. To
say that is to accept the disenfranchisement of 10% of a state’s registered
voters; for the state to take this position is shocking.
Id.
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dissent for the five dissenters. Among other things, Judge Posner
remarked, “As there is no evidence that voter impersonation fraud is
a problem, how can the fact that a legislature says it’s a problem turn
it into one? If the Wisconsin legislature says witches are a problem,
shall Wisconsin courts be permitted to conduct witch trials?”98
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit’s stay, with the
effect of blocking use of Wisconsin’s voter identification law in the
November 2014 election. Once again, the Court offered no rationale
for its order. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, issued a brief dissent which read in full:
There is a colorable basis for the Court’s decision due to the
proximity of the upcoming general election. It is particularly troubling that absentee ballots have been sent out without any notation that proof of photo identification must be submitted. But this
Court “may not vacate a stay entered by a court of appeals unless
that court clearly and ‘demonstrably’ erred in its application of
‘accepted standards.’ ” Under that test, the application in this case
should be denied.99

4. Texas.
The Texas case also involved a state voter identification law.100
The federal district court held a lengthy trial to consider section 2
and constitutional claims against the strict identification law. As in
North Carolina, the Department of Justice got involved in the case
and sought to get Texas bailed back into federal preclearance (an
issue still pending in the case).101 Less than weeks before the start of
early voting, on October 20, the court issued a 147-page opinion holding Texas’ law a violation of the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution, both the Equal Protection Clause and the Twenty-fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on poll taxes in federal elections. The trial
court further found that Texas engaged in intentional discrimination
in voting, a prerequisite to consideration for potential renewed
preclearance.

98. 773 F.3d at 795 (Posner, J., dissenting).
99. 135 S. Ct. at 7 (citations omitted). A few months later, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari on the merits. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015) (mem.).
100. For the facts and procedural history described below, see Veasey v. Perry, 71 F.
Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014), stayed, 769 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2014), denying motion to
vacate stay, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015).
101. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department to File New Lawsuit Against
State of Texas over Voter I.D. Law (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-file-new-lawsuit-against-state-texas-over-voter-id-law (“The complaint asks
the court to prohibit Texas from enforcing the requirements of its law, and also requests
that the court order bail-in relief under section 3 of the Voting Rights Act. If granted, this
would subject Texas to a new preclearance requirement.”).
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The trial court’s opinion was not clear as to whether its injunction
in using the identification law went into effect immediately, which
would stop Texas from continuing to use its voter identification law
as it had in the 2014 primaries and other elections. The trial court
then clarified that the law was blocked for the 2014 general election.102
The State of Texas sought a stay of the trial court’s order from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit granted the stay, with the effect of allowing Texas to use the
identification law in the 2014 general election. The Court of Appeals
refused to consider the merits of the arguments against Texas’ identification law, stating that the issues were difficult. Although the court
purported to apply the Nken factors for a stay, it found that Texas
was likely to succeed on the merits only because the district court
imposed a stay just before the election in violation of the Purcell
principle.103 The court looked at the Supreme Court’s recent orders in
the Ohio, North Carolina, and Texas cases and perceived that the
Purcell principle was at work in the cases. Given the proximity to the
election, the Fifth Circuit determined that it was too late for the trial
court to block the use of Texas’ identification law.
Plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s
stay. The Court, once again without explaining its reasoning, refused
to do so. The Court issued an order with a dissent at 5 a.m. on the
Saturday morning before the first Monday of early voting in Texas, a
highly unusual time of day (and unusual day) for the Court to issue a

102. Final Judgment, Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 13-CV00193), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Veasey689.pdf.
103.
First, the State has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on
the merits, at least as to its argument that the district court should not have
changed the voting identification laws on the eve of the election. The court offered no reason for applying the injunction to an election that was just nine
days away, even though the State repeatedly argued that an injunction this
close to the election would substantially disrupt the election process. As discussed in Part III above, the Supreme Court has instructed that we should
carefully guard against judicially altering the status quo on the eve of an election. And, just this term, the Court has stepped in to prevent such alterations
several times. We find that the State has made a strong showing that the district court erred in applying the injunction to this fast-approaching election
cycle.
The other questions on the merits are significantly harder to decide, given
the voluminous record, the lengthy district court opinion, and our necessarily
expedited review. But, given the special importance of preserving orderly elections, we find that this factor weighs in favor of issuing a stay.
769 F.3d at 895.
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ruling. The dissenters could well have been trying to call attention in
a dramatic way to the injustice they saw in the Court’s refusal to
vacate a stay.104
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, issued
a lengthy dissent. The dissent began by distinguishing the Ohio and
North Carolina cases and then turned to Purcell:
Neither application involved, as this case does, a permanent injunction following a full trial and resting on an extensive record
from which the District Court found ballot-access discrimination
by the State. I would not upset the District Court’s reasoned, record-based judgment, which the Fifth Circuit accorded slim, if any,
deference. Cf. Purcell v. Gonzalez (Court of Appeals erred in failing
104. Or so I have suggested. See Richard L. Hasen, Dawn Patrol: Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s Critically Important 5 a.m. Wake-Up Call on Voting Rights, SLATE (Oct. 19,
2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/
ginsburg_s_dissent_in_texas_voter_id_law_supreme_court_order.html.
Justice Ginsburg later gave a bit more insight on the timing in an interview with
NPR’s Nina Totenberg:
Nina Totenberg: Justice Ginsburg, you were up until . . . Friday
night/Saturday morning, writing a passionate dissent in the Texas voter id
case. Just to let people in the audience know, this was a procedural question in
some measure. And you can note a dissent in those kinds of cases and not write
and it is fairly common for that to happen. But you wrote; you were joined by
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor. So why did you write and why did it take until
5 in the morning?
Justice Ginsburg: Why till 5 in the morning? We didn’t get the last filing
from Texas until Friday morning and then the Circuit Justice [Justice Scalia
in this case] as you know has to write a memo. And that came around some
time in the middle of the afternoon. So there wasn’t much time to write the
dissent. I had written a dissent in the North Carolina voting case, voting rights
case. This one was . . . I would say it was very well-reasoned. You called it
passionate.
Nina Totenberg: The point you were making . . . to explain a fact of law here
is that in 2006 the Supreme Court issued a decision that basically said we try
not to disturb what’s going on in an election right before an election because
people will get confused. And you said you did not think that applied here.
Why?
Justice Ginsburg: First this case was unlike others because it had gone
through a complete 9 day trial, reams of evidence, and an excellent decision
written by the district court. This was a new system for Texas. From 20032013, they have a voter id that was reasonable. There were many things you
could present. The new law cut back drastically on that. There had never been
a federal election held under the new law. There had been local elections with
very small turnout. So the poll watchers [workers?-Ed] were more familiar with
old procedur[e]. So I didn’t think this case fell into the mold of we can’t disturb
an election. There had been very little in the way of educational efforts, so that
people knew what the new law required, so that the poll watchers would know.
So I thought that the old system would involve less disruption than this neverdone-in-a-federal-election-before [system].
Rick Hasen, Justice Ginsburg Tells Nina Totenberg About 5 AM Texas Voter ID Decision,
ELECTION L. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=67123.
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to accord deference to “the ruling and findings of the District
Court”). The fact-intensive nature of this case does not justify the
Court of Appeals’ stay order; to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit’s refusal to home in on the facts found by the District Court is precisely why this Court should vacate the stay.
Refusing to evaluate defendants’ likelihood of success on the
merits and, instead, relying exclusively on the potential disruption
of Texas’ electoral processes, the Fifth Circuit showed little respect
for this Court’s established stay standards. See Nken v. Holder
(“most critical” factors in evaluating request for a stay are applicant’s likelihood of success on the merits and whether applicant
would suffer irreparable injury absent a stay). Purcell held only
that courts must take careful account of considerations specific to
election cases, not that election cases are exempt from traditional
stay standards.105

The remainder of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent disputed the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning that a stay would disrupt Texas’ election processes.
True, in Purcell and in recent rulings on applications involving
voting procedures, this Court declined to upset a State’s electoral
apparatus close to an election. Since November 2013, however,
when the District Court established an expedited schedule for resolution of this case, Texas knew full well that the court would issue its ruling only weeks away from the election. The State thus
had time to prepare for the prospect of an order barring the enforcement of [the law]. Of greater significance, the District Court
found “woefully lacking” and “grossly” underfunded the State’s efforts to familiarize the public and poll workers regarding the new
identification requirements.106

The remainder of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reviewed the trial
court’s evidence that the law had a discriminatory purpose and would
have a discriminatory impact on minority voters.107
The potential magnitude of racially discriminatory voter disenfranchisement counseled hesitation before disturbing the District
Court’s findings and final judgment. Senate Bill 14 may prevent
105. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (partial citations omitted).
106. Id. Justice Ginsburg added:
Furthermore, after the District Court’s injunction issued and despite the
State’s application to the Court of Appeals for a stay, Texas stopped issuing alternative “election identification certificates” and completely removed mention
of [the law’s] requirements from government Web sites. In short, any voter confusion or lack of public confidence in Texas’ electoral processes is in this case
largely attributable to the State itself.
Id. at 10-11 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 11-12. Justice Ginsburg also noted that the district court held the law was
an unconstitutional poll tax, an issue not presented in the other 2014 election cases. Id.
at 12.

456

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:427

more than 600,000 registered Texas voters (about 4.5% of all registered voters) from voting in person for lack of compliant identification. A sharply disproportionate percentage of those voters are African-American or Hispanic.108

C. Freeing the 2014 Election Cases of the Purcell Principle
I cannot say for certain that rigid application of the Purcell principle is responsible for the Supreme Court orders in the 2014 election
cases. The Court majority in each case did not give a word of reasons
for its orders. We do not even know if additional Justices dissented
but chose not to note their dissents in the North Carolina, Wisconsin,
or Texas cases.109 But Justice Alito’s110 and Justice Ginsburg’s111 dissents certainly make it appear that Purcell was behind the Court’s
orders. This is also how the Fifth Circuit understood the cases when
it considered a stay of the Texas order112 and how I understood the
cases113 while they were in progress.
Properly applying the standards from the Court’s general rules for
considering emergency relief, there is a strong argument that the
Court reached the right result in the Ohio and Wisconsin cases.
North Carolina is a closer case. The Court’s decision in the Texas
case appears incorrect.
1. Ohio.
The Court was correct to stay the trial court’s order in the Ohio
case. Challengers seemed unlikely to succeed on the merits in the
Supreme Court, despite winning in the courts below. While the pre108. Id. (citation omitted).
109. In Ohio, there were four noted dissents, so no other Justices could have dissented.
Husted v. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.).
110. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
111. Veasey, 135 S. Ct. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 897 (5th Cir. 2014) (Costa, J., concurring) (“I agree
with Judge Clement that the only constant principle that can be discerned from the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in this area is that its concern about confusion resulting
from court changes to election laws close in time to the election should carry the day in the
stay analysis. The injunction in this case issued even closer in time to the upcoming election than did the two out of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits that the Supreme Court recently
stayed. On that limited basis, I agree a stay should issue.”).
113. Richard L. Hasen, How to Predict a Voting Rights Decision: The Supreme
Court Just Made It Harder to Vote in Some States and Easier in Others, SLATE (Oct. 10,
2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/10/
supreme_court_voting_rights_decisions_contradictions_in_wisconsin_ohio_north.html
(“But there is a consistent theme in the court’s actions, which we can call the ‘Purcell principle’ after the 2006 Supreme Court case Purcell v. Gonzalez: Lower courts should be very
reluctant to change the rules just before an election, because of the risk of voter confusion
and chaos for election officials. The Texas case may raise the hardest issue under the
Purcell principle, and how it gets resolved will matter a lot for these types of election
challenges going forward.”).
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cise application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to vote denial
cases remains up in the air,114 it is doubtful that the conservative
Supreme Court—the same court which recently hobbled section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act in the Shelby County case and has displayed
routine skepticism and hostility toward race-based claims—would
read the Voting Rights Act so expansively as to cover a jurisdiction’s
cutback of early voting from five weeks to four weeks, especially
when the jurisdiction sent every voter in the state an application
for a no-excuse absentee ballot to be voted during the early voting
period. Even with proof that African-American voters in Ohio used
early voting, and especially “Golden Week,” more than white voters,
the current Supreme Court is quite unlikely to hold that the Ohio
legislature’s cutback in early voting, which makes it marginally more
difficult to cast a vote and has a disparate impact on minority voters,
deprives minority voters of an opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.
This lack of a major burden on voters also factors into the balance
of hardships to the parties, another key part of the Rostker test
for stays and related tests. Ohio voters deprived of the extra week
to vote have other ample ways to cast a vote. The State’s burden of
adding an extra week is small as well, requiring additional personnel
and administration.
Finally, the public interest does not cut strongly in one direction.
On the one hand, expanding opportunities to vote can serve the
public interest. On the other hand, the public has an interest in efficient administration of elections, and adding back the week would
impose additional costs. Of course, the timing close to the election
(the Purcell principle) cuts against a late court order to change election
timing.
Given the weakness of the merits on the plaintiffs’ side, the Court
seemed correct in staying the lower court. The Purcell factor reinforces this decision.
2. Wisconsin.
The Supreme Court also seemed correct in its decision in the Wisconsin case, vacating the Seventh Circuit stay which would have
had the effect of allowing the State of Wisconsin to immediately
implement its voter identification law.115 This case was a no-brainer
for reversal. The State admitted that such a precipitous implementation of its law would disenfranchise up to ten percent of the state’s
population, especially residents born out of state who would have
114. See HASEN, supra note 73, at 288-92.
115. Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014).
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difficulty getting the right documentation in time, and put burdens
on those voters who had already received their absentee ballots
which, if the law were implemented, would not be counted unless the
voters produced identification—something not required by the original
instructions.116
Putting aside whether Wisconsin’s voter identification law as a
whole was likely to be found by the Supreme Court to violate either
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, there was no real question that the immediate implementation of the law would violate both, by disenfranchising voters
for no compelling reason, and with that burden falling disproportionately on minority voters. Aside from the likelihood of convincing the
Supreme Court that the precipitous disenfranchisement was likely
illegal, the relative burdens faced by the parties tilted heavily in favor of the challengers. On the one side were the many voters who
would be disenfranchised when a rollout planned for eight months
was compressed into a few weeks. On the other hand, the State posited an interest in preventing voter fraud, which was totally hypothetical and unproven.117 As in other states, Wisconsin could not
point to significant instances of voter impersonation fraud which
would justify imposing such a law at all,118 much less imposing such a
law on a truncated schedule. Many members of the public who were
not plaintiffs stood the risk of being disenfranchised, tilting the public interest in Wisconsin’s favor. Finally, the Purcell principle seemed
to have strong application here, with a change just before the election
likely to both confuse voters and put new burdens on election
administrators.
Even accepting Justice Alito and Justice Scalia’s statement in the
Wisconsin case dissent that the Court should apply the “demonstrable error” standard in determining whether to vacate a stay imposed
by a Court of Appeals,119 the Wisconsin case—with its certainty of
disenfranchisement, lack of strong government interest in immediate
implementation of its law, and timing so close to the election as to
risk both voter confusion and election administrator chaos—meets
the standard. It is troubling that these dissenting Justices would tolerate certain disenfranchisement out of deference to the Court of Appeals, an appellate court which, considering the issue en banc twice,
split evenly on the question.

116. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853-62 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744
(7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2015) (mem.).
117. Id. at 847.
118. Id. at 847-48.
119. 135 S. Ct. at 7 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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3. North Carolina.
North Carolina presents a closer case on the Supreme Court’s decision to stay the Fourth Circuit’s order putting North Carolina’s end
of same-day voter registration and out-of-precinct voting on hold.120
Compared to Ohio, North Carolina’s case presented both more evidence of a disparate effect of legislative rollbacks of voting rights as
well as a more nuanced understanding of the scope of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court will
agree with the Fourth Circuit’s views on the facts and the law, but
the Fourth Circuit’s analysis was nuanced and careful, with the
potential to be affirmed on the merits. Further, the burdens on voters
in North Carolina appeared more significant than the modest cutback in early voting days in Ohio.
On the other hand, North Carolina voters still had many other
opportunities to vote.121 Further, as noted by the Fourth Circuit dissent,122 making these changes close to the election burdened election
administrators: the State had already set out its procedures for voting, and this change would mean new instructions in the period just
before the election.123
In such a close case, arguably, the Supreme Court should have deferred to the Fourth Circuit’s decision to grant the narrow preliminary injunction in North Carolina. Deference seems to make the most
sense in close cases. Or perhaps the Court should have deferred to
the district court, which actually considered the evidence first. Recall
that in Purcell, the Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for
lack of deference to the decision of the district court not to grant a
preliminary injunction.124 The Court’s rules on which court deserves
deference remain uncertain and underdeveloped.
4. Texas.
The Court erred in failing to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay, even
applying the “demonstrable error” standard of review.125 As Justice
120. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters of N.C., 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014).
121. Despite the loss of same-day voter registration and cutbacks in early voting, the
amount of early voting actually increased in 2014 compared to the 2010 midterm election,
especially among Democrats. Nate Cohn, For Democrats, Turnout Efforts Look Successful
(Though Not Elections), N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/15/
upshot/evaluating-the-success-of-democratic-get-out-the-vote-efforts.html?_r=0 (“Since 2010,
turnout increased by 14 percent in North Carolina counties that voted for President
Obama, but just 4 percent in counties that voted for Mitt Romney.”).
122. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 249 (4th Cir.
2014) (Motz, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 252-53.
124. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).
125. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014).
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Ginsburg pointed out in dissent, the court failed to properly apply the
Nken standard to consider whether or not to stay the district court
order enjoining Texas’ continued use of its voter identification law.126
Instead, the Fifth Circuit decided the question of a stay solely as a
matter of timing under the Purcell principle.127
By failing to properly apply the Nken standard, the Court of Appeals never examined the likelihood of success on the merits or the
relative hardship of the parties.128 With the Court of Appeals failing
to examine the merits, it (and the Supreme Court) should have deferred on the facts to the trial court, which held a full trial. The trial
court determined not only that the law was likely to have a disparate
impact on minority voters but also that the Texas legislature passed
the law with racially discriminatory intent.129 Further, the trial court
determined the law was an unconstitutional poll tax because of the
costs associated with getting needed documentation.130
Whether or not the Supreme Court would likely agree with the
district court’s more expansive reading of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, or the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, it should have deferred to the district court
given the finding of intentional racial intent. There is no question
that voting laws passed with a racially discriminatory purpose can
violate both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Further,
factual findings of trial courts, such as the district court’s finding of
racially discriminatory purpose, are entitled to considerable deference unless they are clearly erroneous. The Fifth Circuit not only
failed to reject the trial court’s factual finding on this point as clearly
erroneous—it refused to examine the record on the question when
deciding to stay the trial court’s injunction.
The Fifth Circuit also failed to meaningfully consider the irreparable harm to the parties or the public interest aside from application
of the Purcell principle. The trial court’s factual finding that up to
600,000 Texans lacked the right kind of identification and could not
easily receive it would be a factual finding entitled to deference unless clearly erroneous. This large risk of disenfranchisement would
126. Id. at 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
127. See Veasey v. Perry, 769 F.3d 890, 892-95 (5th Cir. 2014).
128. The Fifth Circuit held that the state would be irreparably harmed if it could not
enforce its laws. Id. at 895. It then said that the individual voter plaintiffs “may be
harmed” by the stay, but then in a footnote backpedaled: “The State contends that no individual voter plaintiffs would actually be harmed by a stay. But, at this time, we decline to
decide the fact-intensive question of which individual voter plaintiffs would be harmed.” Id.
at 896 & n.4. The failure to engage with the facts makes the balancing the court purported
to engage in meaningless.
129. Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627, 695-703 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
130. Id. at 703-07.
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have to be balanced against the State’s interest in preventing voter
fraud. And here, once again, the Court of Appeals did not address,
much less find clearly erroneous, the district court’s factual finding
that there was no significant evidence of impersonation fraud to support Texas’ voter identification law and that claims of fraud were a
pretext for unconstitutional discrimination.
Faced with such a record, the Supreme Court in the Texas case
should have sided with Justice Ginsburg’s dissent and put Texas’
voter identification law on hold until the Fifth Circuit (and potentially the Supreme Court) could fully review the factual findings and
legal conclusions the district court made after a full trial on the merits. Leaving the decision to hang solely on the Purcell principle risked
the disenfranchisement of voters without good reason and violated
the Court’s own stated standards for determining whether to vacate a
stay imposed by a court of appeals.
IV. GIVING REASONS (AFTER THE FACT) IN
EMERGENCY (ELECTION) CASES
Whether or not the Supreme Court in reviewing emergency election cases is going to rein in the Purcell principle in order to apply
the Court’s more general standards for granting or denying emergency relief, the Court should give lower courts and the public a fuller
explanation for its actions. An explanation could come weeks or
months after the Court issues an emergency order in the form of a
separate opinion or set of opinions, much like the practice of some
state supreme courts in dealing with emergency election litigation.
State supreme courts,131 federal district courts,132 and federal courts
of appeal133 have followed this practice.
131. See, e.g., Malnar v. Joice, 337 P.3d 43, 44 (Ariz. 2014) (“We previously issued an
order affirming the superior court’s removal of Elizabeth Joice’s name from the 2014
general election ballot for a vacant term on the Peoria Unified School District Governing
Board. This opinion explains our reasoning.”).
132. For example, Judge O’Malley of the Northern District of Ohio wrote:
After careful consideration, while, for reasons that will be explained in detail in the Court’s forthcoming memorandum opinion in this matter, the Court
ultimately rejects both parties’ legal theories, it orders implementation of one of
the Board’s alternative remedies: limited voting. The Court issues this summary order now to accommodate the concerns expressed by the Board of Elections and to provide the parties with guidance as to how to prepare for this
fall’s upcoming Board elections. The Court will explain the full rationale for
reaching this result in the opinion that will issue shortly.
Order at 3, United States v. Euclid City Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(No. 08-CV-2832), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/euclid-order.pdf.
133. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Gessler, 773 F.3d 200, 202 n.1 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We
held oral argument on October 7 and issued an interim order on October 14. This opinion
explains the basis of that order and does not consider events occurring after October 14.”);
Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade, 488 F. App’x 890, 891 (5th Cir. 2012) (“On September 6,
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There is even Supreme Court precedent for doing so. In 1942, the
Supreme Court considered habeas corpus petitions involving the
detention of German citizens during World War II. In Ex Parte
Quirin,134 the Court issued an order in the case, following it up a few
months later with an explanatory opinion.135 But the Court has not
followed that practice, either in Bush v. Gore or in the 2014 election
cases, when the press of time made an immediate decision, but not
full opinion, necessary.
It is possible that many of the criticisms of the logic and argument
of Bush v. Gore could have been avoided if the Court had more time
to work on the opinion. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, in the Bush v.
Gore majority, later told journalist Jan Crawford Greenburg: “I don’t
think what emerged in the last opinion was the Court’s best effort. It
was operating under a very short time frame, to say the least. Given
more time, I think we probably would’ve done better.”136 Similarly,
Justice Kennedy, also in the majority, told Greenburg, “The problem
with Bush v. Gore was that it came so fast, it had to be decided so
fast.”137
The benefits of giving reasons are many.138 Reasons will help lower
courts use the right standards in election cases, rather than having
to try to read tea leaves from unexplained Court orders. Following
the Court’s normal procedural regularity in election cases will bolster
the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of the public, something especially important in controversial cases, such as election cases.139 Following usual and articulated rules may also discipline Justices into
deciding similar cases alike, regardless of the identity of the parties.
Giving reasons imposes three significant costs as well. First, it
imposes time costs on the Justices, who often have to put aside their
work on the Court’s normal caseload to deal with these emergency

2012, we entered an order granting Appellant Texas Secretary of State Hope Andrade’s
Emergency Motion to Stay the district court’s Order (as modified) granting in part a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of certain Texas statutes and stating that
reasons would be assigned later. Those reasons follow.”).
134. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (per curiam).
135. Id. at 20 (“On July 31, 1942, after hearing argument of counsel and after full consideration of all questions raised, this Court affirmed the orders of the District Court and
denied petitioners’ applications for leave to file petitions for habeas corpus. By per curiam
opinion we announced the decision of the Court, and that the full opinion in the causes
would be prepared and filed with the Clerk.”) (citation omitted).
136. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 175 (2007).
137. Id.
138. See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995)
(exploring the logic of giving reasons).
139. See Baude, supra note 27, at 9-15 (noting the benefits of procedural regularity and
legitimacy in Court decision-making).
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motions in the first place. However, if the Court could work on these
cases when not up against pressing deadlines, it could issue an opinion with reasons even months after a decision.
Second, giving reasons could cause the Court to decide issues it
would rather avoid or would prefer to resolve in another case with a
better-developed factual record. This is a genuine concern. Having
the Court decide the full scope of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
vote denial cases based on the relatively spare record in some of
these cases could lead the Court to make poor decisions which it
could avoid in reviewing a more fully formed case. The Court can deal
with this problem in a few ways: asking for supplemental briefing,
remanding for additional fact-finding, or issuing an opinion that limits the Court’s precedential holding, explaining that the Court may
view the legal issue differently when presented more fully in a subsequent case.
Finally, forcing the Court to give reasons may make it more difficult for the Court to reach prudential decisions of compromise in
these cases. As noted, both Purcell and Wheaton might be viewed as
cases in which the Court wanted to preserve the status quo and put
issues off for another time. Further, Justices Breyer and Kagan
might not have (publicly) dissented in the North Carolina case in
hopes that such restraint could induce the Chief Justice and Justice
Kennedy not to dissent (or publicly dissent) in the Wisconsin case.
This kind of tacit compromise or horse trading is, of course, speculation.140 But if such prudential/political considerations are going into
how the Court decides some of these controversial, high profile cases,
reason-giving could act as a deterrent. If Justices Breyer and Kagan
have to explain their votes in the North Carolina case, they may
change how they vote.
While these are real costs, they are ultimately outweighed by the
duty of the Court to explain its actions in a democracy and the potential that reason-giving will lead the Court to make more consistent
decisions and bolster the Court’s legitimacy. We vest the Court with
great power over everything from elections to abortion, gay marriage
and health care. Every important issue comes before the Court, and
it is often the last word in how these cases are decided. The Court
owes us, and itself, explanations when it takes important actions that
broadly affect U.S. life and liberty and the strength of American
democracy.

140. On normative issues related to such vote trading, see Evan H. Caminker, Sincere
and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2333-79
(1999).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Purcell principle is an important one which should be considered any time a court is asked to intervene close to an election: courts
should weigh the risk of voter confusion and the burdens on election
administrators when courts make changes to election rules close to
an election.
Purcell should not be a stand-alone principle, but the Supreme
Court’s silence in the 2014 election cases threatens to make it one.
Instead, the Court should clarify that the Purcell principle is part of
the public interest factor which courts should consider along with
likelihood of success on the merits, relative hardship to the parties,
and appropriate deference to lower courts in deciding whether to
grant a stay or other emergency relief in an election case. Had the
Court properly applied its usual test in the 2014 election cases, it
would have blocked Texas’ voter identification law from being used in
the 2014 election, as Justice Ginsburg urged in her dissent. The
Court perhaps would have reached a different conclusion in the
North Carolina voting case as well.
Finally, the Court should issue opinions, even months after the
fact, explaining its reasoning in the election cases. Such opinions will
increase the Court’s legitimacy in deciding controversial election
issues and could discipline the Court to apply consistent legal standards to requests for emergency relief.

